Abduction allows us to model interpretation of discourse as the explanation of observables, given additional knowledge about the world. In an abductive framework, many explanations can be constructed for the same observation, requiring an approach to estimate the likelihood of these alternative explanations. We show that, for discourse interpretation, weighted abduction has advantages over alternative approaches to estimating the likelihood of hypotheses. However, weighted abduction has no probabilistic interpretation, which makes the estimation and learning of weights difficult. To address this, we propose a formal probabilistic abductive framework that captures the advantages weighted abduction when applied to discourse interpretation.
Introduction
In this paper, we explore discourse interpretation based on a mode of inference called abduction, or inference to the best explanation. Abductionbased discourse processing was studied intensively in the 1980s and 1990s (Charniak and Goldman, 1989; Hobbs et al., 1993) . This framework is appealing because it is a realization of the observation that we understand new material by linking it with what we already know. It instantiates in discourse understanding the more general principle that we understand our environment by coming up with the best explanation for the observables in the environment. Hobbs et al. (1993) show that abductive proofs can be efficiently exploited for a whole range of natural language pragmatics problems, such as word sense disambiguation, anaphora and metonymy resolution, interpretation of noun compounds and prepositional phrases, and detection of discourse relations. As applied to discourse interpretation, abduction was shown to have advantages over deduction, a more classical mode of inference (Ovchinnikova, 2012) . One serious advantage concerns treatment of incomplete knowledge. In the cases when it is impossible to provide it with all the knowledge which is relevant for interpretation of a particular piece of text, deductive reasoners fail to find a prove. Instead of a deterministic yes/no proof abduction provides a way of measuring in how far the input formula was proven and which of its parts could not be proven.
In the early 90s, research on abduction-based discourse processing resulted in good theoretical work and in interesting small-scale systems, but it faced three difficulties: 1) parsers were slow and not accurate enough, so that inference had no place to start, 2) inference processes were neither efficient nor accurate enough, 3) there was no large knowledge base designed for discourse processing applications. In the last two decades, the first of these difficulties has been addressed by progress in statistical parsing, e.g. (McClosky et al., 2006; Huang, 2008; Bos, 2011) . Recently, efficient reasoning techniques were developed that overcome the second difficulty (Inoue and Inui, 2011; Inoue et al., 2012b) . Finally, it has been shown that there exists sufficient knowledge about the world -at a level of precision that enables its translation into formal logic -available in a variety of resources (Ovchinnikova et al., 2011; Ovchinnikova, 2012) . These advances have recently been capitalized upon in several large-scale applications of abduction to discourse processing tasks (Inoue and Inui, 2011; Ovchinnikova et al., 2011; Ovchinnikova, 2012; Inoue et al., 2012a) .
In an abductive framework, often many explanations can be provided for the same observation. In order to find the best solution for our pragmatic problem, we need to be able to choose the best, i.e. the most probable, explanation. Several ap-proaches were proposed for estimating the likelihood of alternative abductive explanations: costbased abduction (Charniak and Shimony, 1990) , weighted abduction (Hobbs et al., 1993) , abduction based on Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 1988; Charniak and Goldman, 1989; Raghavan and Mooney, 2010) , abduction based on Markov Logic Networks (Kate and Mooney, 2009) .
In this paper, we show that weighted abduction employing a cost propagation mechanism (see Section 3) and favoring low-cost explanations has certain features relevant for discourse processing that other approaches do not have (see Section 4). The main such feature is the approach to unification, i.e. associating two entities with each other, so that their common properties only need to be proved or assumed once (see Section 2). Weighted abduction favors explanations with the maximum number of unifications. Thus, it favors those explanations that link parts of observations together and supports discourse coherence, which is crucial for discourse interpretation.
There is not yet any work on linking weights in weighted abduction to probabilities, which makes the estimation and learning of the weights difficult. In this paper, we show that the original cost propagation mechanism in weighted abduction as informally introduced in (Hobbs et al., 1993 ) cannot be interpreted in terms of probabilities. However, we can still capture features of weighted abduction desirable for discourse processing in a formal probabilistic framework based on Bayesian Networks. As a result, we obtain a theoretically sound probabilistic abductive framework favoring explanations relevant for discourse interpretation.
Abduction
Abduction is inference to the best explanation. Formally, logical abduction is defined as follows: Given: Background knowledge B, observations O, where both B and O are sets of first-order logical formulas, Find: A hypothesis H such that H ∪ B |= O, H ∪ B |=⊥, where H is a set of first-order logical formulas.
Observation O is usually a conjunction of existentially quantified propositions (Charniak and Goldman, 1989; Hobbs et al., 1993; Raghavan and Mooney, 2010) :
We extend the notion of observation by allowing inequalities (x = y) as conjuncts. 
Background knowledge B is a set of first-order logic formulas. In order to keep the inference process computationally tractable, B is often restricted to a set of Horn clauses (Charniak and Shimony, 1990; Hobbs et al., 1993; Kate and Mooney, 2009; Raghavan and Mooney, 2010) . Thus, each background axiom has the form
where all variables on the left-hand side are universally quantified with the widest possible scope and all variables occurring on the right-hand side only are existentially quantified. We weaken this restriction allowing multiple literals on the righthand side of the background axioms because of the importance of the context and compositionality for discourse interpretation. For example, in order to express the fact that a testing process can be called "dry run", we use the following axiom:
Breaking this axiom into two different axioms (one implying that the process is dry and the other implying that it is a run) will result in loosing the binding of the arguments of dry and run.
We allow inequalities (x = y) as conjuncts in the background axioms. Inequalities can be used to represent incompatibility. For example, the axiom below represents the fact that the arguments of the relation parent of refer to different objects:
The two main inference operations in abduction are backchaining and unification. Backchaining is the introduction of new assumptions given an observation and background knowledge. For example, given O = q(A) and B = {∀x(p(x) → q(x))}, there are two candidate hypotheses: 
Both operations (backchaining and unification) can be applied as many times as possible to generate a possibly infinite set of hypotheses. The generation of the set of hypotheses H initialized as an empty set can be formalized as follows.
Estimating Hypothesis Likelihood
Often many hypotheses can be constructed for the same observation. In order to find the best solution for our pragmatic problem, we need to choose the best, i.e. the most probable, hypothesis. Several approaches were proposed for estimating the likelihood of alternative abductive explanations. Charniak and Shimony (1990) propose costbased abduction. In this framework, the likelihood of a hypothesis depends on the probability of the assumed atomic propositions to be true.
Another popular approach to abduction is based on Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 1988; Charniak and Goldman, 1989; Raghavan and Mooney, 2010) . In this framework, abductive explanations are represented by a directed graph constituting a Bayesian net, such that the nodes of the graph correspond to atomic predications and the edges connect explanations with the predications they explain. Each node has an associated conditional probability P (A|B), where B is an explanation of A. Given the constructed Bayesian net, the best abductive hypothesis is selected using standard methods, which assign values to the unobserved nodes in the network that maximize the posterior probability of the joint assignment given the observations. One more approach developed by (Kate and Mooney, 2009 ) is based on Markov Logic Networks (MLNs) (Richardson and Domingos, 2006) . In this approach, a weight is assigned to each background axiom that reflects the strength of a constraint it imposes on the set of possible worlds. The higher the weight, the lower the probability of a world that violates the axiom. An MLN can be viewed as a set of templates for constructing Markov networks. Originally, MLNs employ deductive reasoning. Kate and Mooney (2009) adapt MLNs for abductive inferences by introducing reverse implications for every axiom in the knowledge base and adding mutual exclusivity constraints on the transformed axioms.
Finally, weighted abduction (Hobbs et al., 1993) proposes a cost propagation mechanism for selecting best hypotheses. In this framework, each atomic observation is assigned a positive realvalued cost. Atomic antecedents in the background axioms are assigned positive real-valued weights. If an axiom α = P → Q is applied then the cost of each newly introduced literal p in P is equal to the sum of the costs of the literals in Q multiplied by the weight of p in α. For example, given the axiom ∀x(p(x) 0.9 ∧ s(y) 0.1 → q(x)) and the observation q(A) $10 , the literal p(A) costs $10 × 0.9 = $9 and the literal s(y) costs $10 × 0.1 = $1. When two literals are unified, the result of their unification is assigned the minimum of their costs. For example, given the observation p(x) $10 ∧ p(y) $20 there is a hypothesis x = y $10 . The cost of the hypothesis is equal to the sum of the costs of the assumptions. Each unification reduces the overall cost of the hypothesis, while an application of an axiom can increase or decrease the overall cost depending on whether its total weight is less or greater than 1. There is not yet any work on interpreting the weighted abduction cost propagation in terms of probabilities. Therefore the minimal cost hypothesis does not necessarily correspond to the most probable one.
All mentioned approaches to estimating the likelihood of abductive hypotheses have a common problem. The problem is that they all imply certain assumptions that cannot be proved or disproved practically because of the absence of the gold standard (collection of correct proof graphs)
that is obviously very difficult to obtain. Costbased abduction implies that the likelihood of a hypothesis depends on the joint likelihood of the assumptions only and that the assumptions are mutually independent. Abduction based on Bayesian Networks implies that the truth of the literals depends on their direct explanations only. MNLbased abduction implies that the probability of a background axiom to hold does not depend on the observation. All mentioned framework imply that unifications always hold.
In order to successfully apply abductive inference to pragmatic tasks, we should formulate the underlying independence assumptions with a good understanding of our domain of interest (in our case, it is discourse interpretation) and design a probabilistic framework correspondingly.
Abduction for Discourse Processing
Weighted abduction has three features, missing in other abduction-based frameworks, that are especially relevant for discourse processing. In this section, we discuss these features.
Unification The first feature is related to the unification inference. Weighed abduction prefers hypotheses with the maximum number of unifications. Therefore, it favors those explanations that link parts of observations together and thus support discourse coherence.
Suppose we want to construct an interpretation for the sentence John composed a sonata. The verb compose has two readings, 1) the "put together" reading (e.g., The party composed a committee, and 2) the "create art" reading. Suppose there are the following axioms:
Axioms (1) and (2) correspond to the two readings of compose. Axiom (3) states that a sonata is a work of art. Weighted abduction favors Axiom (2) over (1) for the observed sentence, because unification of sonata resulting from the application of Axioms 2 and 3 with the observable sonata reveals the implicit discourse redundancy and supports linking the meanings of compose and sonata.
As mentioned above, weighted abduction implies unconditional unification. In the discourse interpretation context, unification is one of the principal methods by which coreference is resolved. A naive approach to coreference in an inference-based framework is to unify propositions having the same predicate names unless it implies logical contradictions (Hobbs et al., 1993; Bos, 2011) . However, in situations when knowledge necessary for establishing contradictions is missing, the naive procedure results in overmerging. For example, given O = ∃x, y(animal(x) ∧ animal(y)), we do not want to assume that x equals y when dog(x) ∧ cat(y) are observed. For John runs and Bill runs, with the observations O = ∃x, y(John(x)∧run(x)∧Bill(y)∧run(y)), we do not want to assume that John and Bill are the same individual just because they are both running. If we had complete knowledge about incompatibility (dog and cat are disjoint, people have unique first names), the overmerging problem might not occur because of logical contradictions. However, it is not plausible to assume that we would have an exhaustive knowledge base. A proposal to introduce weighted unification is described in (Inoue et al., 2012a) , where unification costs depend on the semantic relation (synonymy vs. antonymy), modality and polarity, and shared properties of the unified literals.
Observations costs The second feature concerns the unequal treatment of atomic observations depending on their initial cost. Hobbs et al. (1993) mention that costs reflect the demand for propositions to be proved. Those propositions that are most likely to be linked referentially to other parts of the discourse are expensive to assume. This idea is illustrated by an example provided in (Blythe et al., 2011) . Suppose there are two sentences.
The smart man is tall. The tall man is smart.
The logical representation for each of them is ∃x(smart(x) ∧ tall(x) ∧ man(x))
. But certain syntactic features attached to propositions (e.g., definite article) influence the probability of the propositions to be explained or assumed. In the first sentence we want to prove smart(x) to anchor the sentence referentially. Then tall(x) is new information to be assumed. Blythe et al. (2011) suggest having a high cost on smart(x) to force the proof procedure to find this referential anchor. The cost on tall(x) will be low, to allow it to be assumed without expending effort in trying to locate that fact in background knowledge. For the second sentence, the case is the reverse.
Suppose we know that educated people are smart and big people are tall, and furthermore that John is educated and Bill is big and both of them are men. This knowledge is formalized as follows:
In weighted abduction, the best interpretation for the first sentence is that the smart man is John, because he is educated, and the cost for assuming he is tall is paid. The interpretation to avoid is one that says x is Bill; he is tall because he is big, and the cost of assuming he is smart is paid. Weighted abduction with its differential costs on observables favors the first and disfavors the second.
Weighted conjuncts in the antecedents
The third feature of weighted abduction is related to the weights of the conjuncts in the antecedents of the background axioms. Hobbs et al. (1993) say that the weights correspond to the "semantic contribution" each conjunct makes to its consequent and discuss the following example: Hobbs et al. (1993) assume that car contributes more to convertible than no-top, therefore the former should have a higher weight forcing its explanation. Thus, given a convertible mentioned in text, we will probably intend to link it to some other mentioning of a car rather than to a mentioning of an object with no top.
∀x(car(x)∧ no-top(x) → convertible(x))

Graph Representation of Hypotheses
In this section, we introduce a formalization allowing us to estimate probabilities of abductive hypotheses in Section 6. We follow (Charniak and Shimony, 1990) and represent the set of all possible hypotheses as an AND/OR directed acyclic graph (AODAG).
Definition 1 An AODAG is a 3-tuple < G, l, o >,
where:
G is a directed acyclic graph, G = (V, E).
l is a function from V to {AND, OR}, called the label. A node labeled AND is called an AND node, etc.
o ⊆ V is a set of observed nodes.
q(x, y)
s(z) Figure 1 : AODAG for the running example.
Consider an observation O = ∃x, y(q(x, y) ∧ r(x)) and the background knowledge B:
1) ∀y(p(y) → ∃x(q(x, y))) 2) ∀x, z(p(x) ∧ s(z) → ∃y(q(x, y) ∧ r(x)))
The AODAG in Fig. 1 is constructed by applying backchaining and unification to observation O. The nodes marked with a double circle represent inference operations: backchaining using Axioms 1 ("1" node) and 2 ("2" node) as well as unification ("U p " node). Note that all operation nodes are AND nodes. All literal nodes are OR nodes. The notation u v is used to say that u is an immediate parent of v. In our example, node "1" is a parent of q(x, y) or 1 q(x, y).
Definition 2 A truth assignment for an AODAG is a function f from V to {T, F }. A truth assignment is a model if the following conditions hold:
1. If v ∈ o then f (v) = T .
If v ∈ o and v is an AND node then one of the following statements hold:
(a) f (v) = F and ∃u v : f (u) = F . (b) f (v) = T and ∀u v : f (u) = T .
If v ∈ o and v is an OR node then one of the following statements hold:
Condition 1 in Definition 2 ensures that observables are true in every model. Condition 2 ensures that an operation node is true if the result of this operation is true. Otherwise, an operation node is false. Condition 3 ensures that a literal node is true if one of its explanations is true. Otherwise, it can be either true or false. We rely on the "open world" assumption, i.e., we do not assume that the knowledge base contains all possible facts about the world. Thus, assumptions can be made without explanations. Condition 4 rules out inconsistencies that result from an equality and an inequality of the same variables. It rules out truth assignments that assign T to both equality chains
It is easy to see that the set of hypotheses corresponds to the set of models of the AODAG. Given Definition 2, the truth assignment 
Probabilities and Independence Assumptions
Now we are ready to estimate the likelihood of abductive hypotheses relevant for discourse interpretation. Let us associate a random variable from the set {X 1 , ..., X n } with each of v nodes in an AODAG. The variables X i (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) take values from the set {T,
The joint probability distribution of the set {X 1 , ..., X n } is as follows:
where X i is conditioned on π i that denotes all other variables from the set {X 1 , ..., X n } on which X i depends. The question is how to define π i for each X i . In order to do it, we need to make independence assumptions. As discussed in Section 4, the cost propagation mechanism in weighted abduction results in the following model preferences:
1. Other things being equal, a model that results from application of more reliable axioms is favored.
2. Other things being equal, a model that contains more true unification nodes is favored.
3. Other things being equal, a model that explains referential observables is favored.
Let us formulate independence assumptions reflecting the above model preferences. We can use the local Markov property: each variable is conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its immediate parent variables. But we also need a special account for unifications, because any true unification raises the likelihood of the corresponding model.
One option is to say that every axiom node in an AODAG also depends on its parent unification nodes. For example, nodes 1 and 2 in the example AODAG depend on the node U p . However, given more observables there could be more unifications resulting from axiom applications. For example, if we add observable s(t) then the application of Axiom 2 can result in one more unification (t = z). Given a set of golden AODAG models, one can compute all possible unifications resulting from a particular axiom. Alternatively, we can say that it does not matter unifications of which literals result from an axiom; the only thing that matters is how many unifications are there. In order to implement this second option, we introduce one more type of random variables associated with an AODAG: numbU v is associated with each axiom node v. It takes values from the set N and stands for the number of true unifications that are parents of v.
In order to account for referentiality, we introduce another type of random variables We associate random variables X node name with each node of our example AODAG. In addition,
Ref q (x,y) Ref r (x) Figure 2: Bayesian network for the running example AODAG.
we introduce random variables numbU 1 , numbU 2 , Ref q (x,y) and Ref r (x) . Fig. 2 shows the corresponding Bayesian network for the example AODAG that has the following joint probability distribution:
Now we can estimate the probability of all abductive hypotheses or compute the best hypothesis a using standard method for computing Most Probable Explanation (Pearl, 1988 ) that maximizes the posterior probability of the joint assignment given the observations (values of variables X q(x,y) Ref r(x) in our example). If conditional probability tables need to be learned, we can use standard algorithms: Expectation Maximization (Dempster et al., 1977; Langseth and Bangsø, 2001; Ramoni and Sebastiani, 2001 ) and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (Liao and Ji, 2009 ).
Linking Costs and Weights in Weighted Abduction to Probabilities
Section 6 gives us a probabilistic approach to abduction that preserves the relevant discourse interpretation features of weighted abduction, so now we want to see what are the relationships between weights and probabilities across these two frameworks. Consider our running example again. Suppose cost(q(x, y)) = c 1 , cost(r(x)) = c 2 , weight of p(y) in Axiom 1 is w 1 , and weights of p(x) and s(z) in Axiom 2 are w 2 and w 3 correspondingly. There are 5 hypotheses for the given observation. According to the cost propagation scheme, the hypotheses are assigned the following costs.
The corresponding AODAG has 5 models:
Our goal is to find function g such that
The hypothesis cost is a sum of the assumption costs (e.g., cost(H 1 ) = c 1 + c 2 ). Can we derive costs of atomic literals from the probabilities of these literals to be assumed? The smaller the cost, the bigger the probability that the literal is assumed. The event when no axioms are applied to the literal node v is denoted by Assume(v). If we set g to the negative logarithm, then summing costs will be equal to multiplying probabilities:
Model M 1 refers to the event when no axioms are applied: Assume(q(x, y)) ∩ Assume(r(x)). Obviously, the events Assume(q(x, y)) and Assume(r(x)) are not independent, because Axiom 2 is applicable to both q(x, y) and r(x). Therefore we get the following contradiction:
We cannot link the sum of costs of atomic literals to the product of the probabilities of these literals to be assumed, because the assumption events are not independent. Therefore we have to reject Eq. 3. Suppose we selected c 1 and c 2 so that
Can we then link axiom weights to probabilities? Model M 3 refers to the situation when only Axiom 2 is applied. It has the following probability 2 :
Since cost(H 3 ) = (w 2 + w 3 ) * (c 1 + c 2 ), we can try to link w 2 + w 3 to the probability of Axiom 2 to be applied. But in order to compute P (M 3 ) the value of cost(H 3 ) is also required to accommodate the probability of Axiom 1 not to be applied. Thus, instead of one axiom weight for each axiom α we need to have a table of conditional weights depending on all other axioms that can be applied in combination with α. This is not the case in weighted abduction.
The discussion above shows that we need conditional probabilities that cannot be linked to atomic literal costs and weights, because variables assigned to the atomic literal nodes are not independent. The question remains open if it is possible to tune weights and costs so that least cost hypotheses in weighted abduction correspond to the most pragmatically relevant (and the most probable) explanations. This is an empirical question and the answer to it depends on a particular application.
The fact that costs and weights in weighted abduction cannot be linked to probabilities does not make the framework inapplicable to discourse interpretation or any other task. One can see costs
Conclusion
Abduction allows us to model interpretation of discourse as the explanation of observables given knowledge about the world. In an abductive framework, many explanations can be constructed for the same observation. Therefore, an approach to estimating the likelihood of the alternative explanations is required.
In this paper, we showed that the cost propagation mechanism in weighted abduction has advantages over alternative approaches when applied to discourse interpretation. However, costs and weights in weighted abduction have no probabilistic interpretation, which makes their estimation and learning difficult. We proposed a formal framework for computing likelihood of abductive hypotheses with an account of variable inequalities and probabilistic unification. We discussed independence assumptions relevant for discourse processing. We showed that the cost propagation mechanism cannot be interpreted in terms of probabilities, but that features of weighted abduction relevant for discourse interpretation can be still captured in a probabilistic framework.
Future work concerns implementation of the probabilistic abductive framework proposed in Section 6 and its comparison with weighted abduction as tested on specific discourse processing tasks, such as recognizing textual entailment or coreference resolution; see (Ovchinnikova et al., 2011; Inoue et al., 2013) and (Inoue et al., 2012a) for applications of abduction to these tasks.
